Implications for the Adjustment Process of International Asset Risks: Exchange Controls, Intervention and Policy Risk, and Sovereign Risk by Willem H. Buiter
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS
OF INTERNATIONAL ASSET RISKS: EXCHANGE
CONTROLS, INTERVENTION AND POLICY RISK,
AND SOVEREIGN RISK
Willem H. Buiter
Working Paper No. 516




This paper was given at the Conference on Internationalization of
FinancialMarkets and National Economic Policy, April 10—11at
N.Y.U.I would like to thank Robert Stern and Clas Wihlborg for
detailed comments on an earlier version. Financial support from an
N.S.F. Research Grant is gratefully acknowledged. The research
reported here is part of the NBER'sresearch program in
International Studies. Anyopinions expressedare those of the
authorand not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #516
July, 1980
Implications for the Adjustment Process,
of International Asset Risks:
Exchange Controls, Intervention and Policy Risks.
andSovereign Risk:
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the implications of international asset risksfor
the operation of the international adjustment process, with special emphasis
on the scope for monetary policy. After a brief review of actual practice
inthe evaluation of country risk, the paper discusses a number of modifi-
cations in the standardtheoryof efficient international financial markets
that are necessitated by the existence of country risk., For macroeconomic
policy, the major implications are that domestic and foreign assets become.
imperfect substitutes andthat world demandfor domestic assets is likely
tobe less than perfectly elastic, even in the "small country" case, Even
under a fixed exchange rate, a measure of domestic control over domestic









II The measurement of country risk.
IIIThe standard economic view of international financial markets.
IV The implications of political risk for the modelling of
international financial markets.
V The implications of political risk for the international




International asset risks are those risks thatdistinguish an
international loan from a domestic loan which isotherwise the same in all
respects (size, maturity, repayment schedule and evencurrency denomination).
This loan can be for portfolio investmentor for direct investment, to and
from private or public agents.The importance of international asset risk
or country risk is recognized by the financialcommunity and by governments.
For instance, Citicorp, stating thatcountry risk is the "principal
1/
difference between domestic and international business"and that "Country
risk exists whenever Citicorp lends, placesor invests funds across a
2/
country border", devotes a sizeable sectionof its 1975 AnnualReport to
its international lending operations.Alexander Mc.W. Wolfe, Jr. defines
country risk as "...theprimary additional component which distinguishes
an international loan from a domestic loan.Regardless of whether the
borrower happens to be a government, quasi—publiccompany or private entity,
an appraisal of economic and political factors becomes a vitalelement in
3/
evaluating creditworthiness or country risk." Finally, Wihlborg defines
country risk as uncertainty about laws, regulations andproperty rights that
depend solely on the country of issue of a financialasset (Wihlborg [1978, p. 5]).
Inrecent years attention has been focussed mainly onlending by commercial
banksin the western world, especially the U.S.A., toL.D.C.'s.The rapid
expansion of this categoryof international lending has generated fears about
the possibility of default.As the recent freeze on official Iranian assets
in the U.S.A. has demonstrated, however,sovereign risk can affect even those
who lend to the most developed country in the internationalfinancial community.
The precarious external debt positions of countriesas varied as Poland, Turkey,
Zaire, Yugoslavia and Indonesia show that political riskcan be a major factor
regardless of ideology, religion, or stage of development.—2—
Table1
Classificationof types of risk
Domestic Foreign
Economic risk -specific Economic risk -specific
-general —general





debt moratoria debt moratoria
Social risk Social risk
—regional,tribal or —regional,tribal or
class conflict, social class conflict, social
unrest etc. unrest etc.
Intervention and policy risk Intervention and policy risk




borrowers and borrowers and
lenders lenders
—exchangecontrols—3—j
Table 1 presents a simple classification of the kinds of risk likely
to be encountered by a person or institution planning to invest funds.
While the boundaries between the various categories are often vague, even
conceptually, the classification is quite comprehensive.The first important
almost
thing to note is that,every kind of risk that is likely to concern investors
is likely to be present with domestic investment as with foreign investment.
Important differences in degree do often exist, however.Economic and
financial risk can be specific, related to the economic performance of a
specific investment, project, sector or industry, or general.,related to
a country's economic performance with respect to inflation, real output growth
and external balance.Since economic policy is a major determinant of
specific and general economic performance, economic risk and political risk,
or "sovereign risk" are inextricably bound up."Sovereign risks" are the
risks associated with adverse political developments-—wars, coups, revolutions,
expropriation of foreign ownership, discretionary defaults or discretionary
debt moratoria etc.Political and economic risks are themselves functions
of wider social and cultural uncertainties.Intervention and policy risk
can be viewed as the less spectacular forms of sovereign risk.Even broad
macroeconomic fiscal and monetary stabilization policy may affect the return
on certain investments.Together with specific forms of market intervention
(price controls, credit ceilings) and changes in allocative or structural
policies (tax credits, depreciation allowances, subsidies, tariffs, quotas)
they constitute intervention and policy risk.Sovereign risk and intervention
and policy risk merge into legal risk,Changes in contract law, liability
and disclosure laws, problems of conflicting and overlapping jurisdictions,
methods for resolving disputes between lenders and borrowers, legal restrictions
on the repatriation of dividends and profits of foreign investors and other
forms of exchange control, all affect the rate of return to the investor.
A measure of the variety and scope of exchange controls is the Annual Report
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions issued by the IMF, which
for 1979 ran to 470 pages (IMF [1979])- 3A-
Itshould be noted that country risk is typically asymmetric:the degree
of risk depends, for a given borrower, on the countryof habitat (or nationality)
of the lender, or for a given lender, on the countryof habitat (or nationality)
of the borrower.
country risk also often is not a zero—sum risk inwhich gains
to borrowers necessarily equal losses to lenders.To the extent that the
risk "game" has a negative sum it cannot be diversified completely.Also, since
political risks are to a greater or lesser extentunder the control of the
participants in the international loan market,there are obvious moral hazard
problems limiting the extent of coverage against politicalrisk.
Exchange risk and political risk
This paper focuses on the implications of political risk in the most
general sense (i.e. including sovereign risk, intervention and policy risk
and legal risk) for the modeling of international financial markel$ and for
the international adjustment mechanism.
In its widest possible interpretation, political risk should include
a significant share of any exchange risk faced by an investor.Government
actions affect the exchange rate either directly, through exchange rate
peggingor other more flexible forms of exchange rate management or indirectly,
by altering the proximate determinants of exchange rates determined in
marketswithout direct foreign exchange market intervention.The current
andanticipated future course of irnetary policy and the current and prospective
future magnitudes 'f the public sector borrowing requirement are anng the—4—
major channels through which governments affect the behavior of spot and
forward exchange rates, even in a "freely floating" exchange rate regime.
Exchange risk, in the absence of political risk and without adjustment costs
in international financial markets, has been studied exhaustively by economists.
A recent elegant statement of the extent to which exchange rate risk can be
diversified can be found in Frankel [1979].I shall for the most part
ignore exchange risk and concentrate on those risks associated with international
lending and borrowing that would exist even in a world with rigidly fixed
exchange rates which are confidently expected to remain that way forever.
Alternatively, one could interpret the analysis as applying to a world in
which lenders and borrowers of any nationality can issue or purchase financial
claims denominated in any currency or basket of currencies, and in which,
because Frankel's conditions for complete diversifiability are satisfied
5/
there remains no residual exchange risk.
Finally, it should be noted that the "nationality vector" of an
international loan can have a very large number of components indeed.
Table2 provides a summary of the most important dimensions.
Table 2Some "nationality dimensions" of an international loan
-Nationalityof lender
—Countryof residence of lender
-Nationalityof borrower
-Countryof residenceof borrower
—Locationof market (i.e. place of issue)
—Currencydenomination of loan—5—
E.g.the German branch of an American bank could lend, in London, to the
Dutch branch of the State-owned Bank of L.D.C.-x, with the loan denominated
in S.D.R.'s.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows.Section II
briefly considers actual practice in the evaluation of country risk.
Section III reviews the standard economic view of international financial
markets--an application of the theory of efficient capital markets.
Section IV studies how this view of international financial markets must be
modified when country risk is introduced in a number of different ways.
Section V considers the implications of the analysis for the operation of
the international adjustment process, with special emphasis on the scope for
monetarypolicy.
II. The mea.surement of country risk
Unlessthere is a dramatic case of market failure in the markets for
information, the expenditure of resources on the assessment and evaluation
of country risk should be a useful indicator of the importance attributed to
country risk by investors and financial managers.While there is a large
literature, in book and journal article form on the management of foreign
exchange risk (e.g. Aliber [1973, 1975, 1978], Jaque [1978]).
written work on country risk analysis lives mainly in internal memoranda
and pamphlets written by non—academic economists and other practitioners
of the art (but see Zuheir Sofia [19781 and Mc.W. Wolf [1975]).A study
of the available literature suggests that following features are shared by
most applied studies of country risk.(See e.g. Blask [1976], Harberger—6—
[1976], Maroni [1977], Frank and Clive [1971], Feder and Just [1977], Nagy
[1978], Fisk and Rimlinger [1979], Bench [1977], Schuler [1977], Sargen
(1977], Goodman [1977], Puz [1978], Export—Import Bank Policy Analysis Staff
[1977], Mc.W. Wolf [19751, Eaton and Gersovitz [1979, 1980]).
1)What potential lenders attempt to assess is the probability of the
borrower defaulting on the loan.Both "discretionary" default (sovereign
risk)and "bad luck" default (economic and financial risk) are evaluated.
In practice default is but one position on a continuum of different kinds
and degrees of breach of contract (or "arrearages and delinquencies"),
rangingfrom a strictly temporary moratorium on debt service, accompanied
by a rescheduling of debt payments, all the way to a complete and permanent
repudiation of all debt obligations (interest and repayment of principal).
Examples of this most extreme kind of default are the refusal of theSoviet
government to honc financial commitments incurred under theTsarist regime
and the unwillingness of Castro Cuba to honor the obligations of the Battista
era.Country risk analysis consists of formal and informal, qualitative
and quantitative study of the observable (if notalways measurable) correlates
the
ofdefault risk. E.g.1 "checklist" system of assessing risk of future debt
servicingdifficulties isused by five out of thirty—seven U.S.banks
surveyedin 1977by the Export-Import Bank.The system consists in assigning
acardinal rating to each country with respect to a number of indicators
(see Table 3).These ratings for the various indicators are then averaged
into a summary statistic for each country, using a common set of weights.
This summary statistic becorsone of the inputs into the final risk evaluation.
Other banks and institutions make use, in a less formal way, of similar—7—
information in their assessment of country risk.Outside the banks,
academic economists have applied more formal statistical methods (regression
analysis, discriminant analysis etc.) to the assessment of country risk.
(Frank anddive[1971], Feder and Just [19771, Sargen [1977], Export—Import
Bank Policy Analysis Staff [1977], Eaton and Gersovitz [1979-80].
Table 3
Indicators included in checklist system of American banks,
surveyed by Export—Import Bank, that used such a system.
Variable
I -Variablesrelating to the internal economy
GNP
GNP per capita
Growth in GN? per capita
Inflation rate
Money Supply growth
Ratio of investment to income
Net budget position
Ratio of income growth to fixed capital formation
II -Variablesrelating to the external economy
Exports and export growth
Imports and import growth
International reserves
Ratio of reserves to imports
Tradeand current account balances
Debt service ratio
IMF brrowings
Current collection experience of U.S.suppliers
Debtservice payments
Ratioof principal payments to total external debt
Share of gold holdings in total reserves
Share of leading non—oil export in total exports
Share of trade in GDP
Share of short term credit in total credit
Total external debt
III —Socialand political vaiab1es
Political stability
Past trend in unemployment
Regional rating
Source: Goodman[1977].—8—
2) The analysis is done on a country-by—country basis."When assessing
the country risk of a particular nation, it should be analysed separately
and treated on its own merit.No two countries are exactly alike." (Zuheir
Sofia [1978].If this statement, and otheis like it, referred only to the
need to recognize the uniqueness in space and time of every specific country
or lending project, it would be trite but unobjectionable.It seems to reflect,
however, a failure to recognize one of the more robust implications of
portfolio analysis, that is the need to look at a lending institution's entire
portfolio of assets and liabilities rather than at each project or loan
separately.
3) The procedures for evaluating country credit risk seem on the whole
to be rather crude and unsatisfactory.This negative view appears to be
shared even by the major U.S. banks that account for much of the analysis.
Especially striking is the apparent reluctance to systematically test the
ex—post predictive accuracy of the country risk evaluation procedures.Even
where anattemptis made to analyse the available data systematically, the
absence of a clear theoretical framework makes the interpretation of the results
a very uncertain and ambiguous exercise.Two examples will suffice to illustrate
this point.
The policy analysis staff of the Export-Import Bank used logit analysis
to solve the binary choice problem as to whether or not a given country will
reschedule (Export-Import Bank Policy Analysis Staff [1977]).The probability
of a country rescheduling was related to the following set of explanatory
variables.1) percentage change in the CPI (with a positive coefficient),
2) reserve position in the IMPdividedby imports (with a negative coefficient),
a measure of the country's ability to pay its international bills, 3) exports
divided by GDP (with a negative coefficient), a measure of "a country's
foreign exchange generating ability subject to the total demands of the
economy",4)disburseddebt outstanding divided by exports, a measure of the—9—
country's "overall debt situation", (with a positive coefficient, 5) largest
total
export divided byexports (with a positive coefficient), a measureof the
vulnerability of a country's foreign exchange revenues to external price
fluctuations, 6) international reserves divided by imports (with a negative
coefficient), a measure of the "international financial stability of the
nation".
The second example is a study by Sargen [1977] using discriminant analysis
to classify a group of L.D.C. countries into a rescheduling and a non—
rescheduling category.The explanatory variables were 1) debt service ratio,
2) reserve-import ratio,3) export growth rate,4) growth rate of real GNP,
5) level of real GNP per capita, 6) rate of change of the CPI, 7) growth of
a 'Measure of relative purchasing power parity".
Both these studies and others not mentioned here suffer from the absence
of an explicit model of default.Specifically, they cannot differentiate
between "bad-luck" default and "discretionary" or "dishonest" default.If
the r.h.s. variables in these regressions measure any relevant aspect of the
default decision, they try to assess the borrower's current and future
opportunity set, i.e. his ability to repay.This is adequate for a full
analysis of default only if countries never default when they have the economic
ability to pay their debt obligations.However, a solvent borrower may
choose to default if the expected benefit from doing so exceeds the anticipated
current and future costs.These costs are mainly reflected in the defaulting
country's inability to have access to international credit in the future.
This will be a serious constraint if its exports and imports are large, variable
and uncertain.While export variability may therefore make it hard for a
country to service its debt obligations when exports are temporarily (and/or
unexpectedly) low, that same variability provides an additional incentive not
to fall in arrears on its external debt.This more complete view of debt
repudiation has been developed and implemented empirically by Eaton and
Gersovitz [1979, 1980], who model and estimate optimal borrowing ariddefault- 10-
behaviorby debtors and optimal credit rationing by lenders.It would seem
that this approach should lead to better predictions than the ad hoc approaches
adopted in the earlier literature.
4) The occurrence of "arrearages and delinguencies" since World War II
is a comparatively rare event.As of September 30, 1978 total arrearages
and delinquencies on post-World War II debt of U.S. Government agencies
was $612 million, compared with a total post-World War II foreign debt on
the books of the U.S. government on that date of $45.7 billion. (Bergsten
[1979]).Data on non—guaranteed private loans are much harder to come by.
A dramatic recent example is the failure of Zaire to pay interest on its
loanssince June 1975.It is estimated that private debt to commercial
banksup to $930.5 million may have been affected by this (Zuheir Sofia
[1978]). In Zaire's case default was not "discretionary" but reflected
"bad luck" and bad management.Given the ability to pay, the incentive
to default is an increasing function of the volume of outstanding debt and
a decreasing function ofa country's likely future need for access to
internationalcredit markets.The relative infrequency of default may
be a reflection of the superior country risk analysis of public and private
international lending agencies.This seems unlikely, given the quality
of most of the work that I have seen.It is more likely to reflect the
high cost of default, in the form of loss of access to the international
capital markets.Unlike bankrupt individuals, countries can't relocate
and open shop again under a new name.It would therefore seem useful to
do a careful cost-benefit analysis of the resources devoted to theevaluation
ofcountry risk— 11—
III.The Standard Economic View of International Financial Markets
When modelling behavior under uncertainty, professional economists tend
to simply postulate the existence of (objective or subjective) probability
distribution functions for the unknown current and future events whose
outcomes will determine the degree of success or failure of some set of
economic decisions.At its most general level the theory applies the same
paradigm--expected utility maximization--to household consumption, labor-
leisure and portfolio allocation decisions as to the financial and real
investment decisions of the business sector. Porfolio theory——in its
mean—variance incarnation——has become established as the highest form of
rational financial decision—making under uncertainty.This holds for
international as for domestic investment and portfolio management.Rather
less attention has been paid by economists to the exact nature of the
risks faced by different economic agents, the working hypothesis apparently
being that there is a natural division of labor between the practical man
of affairs who evaluates the risks and returns of the various projects in
his domain, and the economist who uses the fruits of this labor to compute
the Markowitz frontier.Unconstrained by any perceived need to relate
their assumed distributions of risks and returns to the realities of
practical portfolio management, economists have tended to go the way of
analytical least resistance.In the field of international finance this
has resulted in a stylized view of the world that I shaell call efficient
international capital markets theory. Efficient international capital
markets are characterized by a number of properties.
1) Instantaneous and continuous market clearing.Given the information
available to all actual and potential market participants, given their
expectations of the future and given the other state variables (exogenous
and predetermined) that together fully describe the state of the system
(the set of international financial markets) ,assetprices and rates of
return always assume the values required to equate demand and supply in all— 12—
2) Competitiveness of all markets.The implicit or explicit
assumption of free entry and many actual or potential traders implies that
all market participants are price takers.The demands and supplies that
are kept in continuous balances are the notional demands of competitive,
expected utility or market value maximizing agents.
3) Rational expectations and incomplete but not asymmetric information.
The anticipations of all agents are based on subjective probability density
functions of future returns that are the same as the true, objective
probability density functions generating these uncertain returns.Since
the theory seldom goes leyond the first two moments of the distribution of
returns, this assumption means in practice that all lenders and borrowers
know the correct means vector and variance-covariance matrix of asset returns.
This assumption that all agents have the same (albeit incomplete) information
will turn out to be very restrictive and very important.
4) All assets are perfectly divisible and perfectly "liquid", i.e. all
assets are marketable in any quantity at parametric prices.There are
no transactions costs (including costs of gathering information) and r
restrictions on short sales.
5) Each country issues an asset that is risk free in terms of that
country's currency.Investors can borrow or lend any amount at these
risk—free rates.Except for their currency denomination, these risk-free
assets are identical in all respects.
A market with properties 1) -4)is inforinationally efficient in the
sense that the prices determined in such a market "fully reflect" the
available, homogenous information.Property 5) is not essential for market
efficiency but is the simplest way to generate one of the important
propositions of international financial market theory, i.e. interest parity.
I shall not be concerned with the issue of the extent to which prices in
markets with non-homogenous asymmetric information are efficient aggregators
of this diverse, heterogenous information (on this see e.g. Grossman— 13—
Someof the important implications of efficient international capital
markets theory are the following.
a)For the risk—free assets mentioned under property 5), international
interest parity prevails: the domestic interest, r, equals the foreign
interest rate r* plus the forward discount on the domestic currency,
r =r*+ E.
b) International investors canandwill engage in instantaneous stock-
shift rebalancing of their portfolios between domestic and foreign assets
in response to new information.
c) Even with risk—averse investors, the forward exchange rate will be an
unbiased, mean squared error miminizing predictor of the future spot rate
with the appropriate maturity, if the conditions stated by Frankel [1979]
are satisfied.These assumptions were 1) rates of return on nominal
assets are independent of rates of return on real assets and 2) there are
no 'outside' assets denominated in the currency of the country that issues
them.
d) The "small country" assumption that the interest rate on its own
liabilities is parametric to a borrowing country (i.e. that there is an
.nfinitely elastic world demand for the country's debt) is an appropriate
one for a large number of actual 'small' countries, i.e. countries with a
small share of world wealth, GNP and trade (although not, presumably for the
U.S.A.).
e) Foreign exchange market intervention (sales and purchases of international
assets by central banks) is irrelevant for the real economy to the extent
that it is anticipated and harmful to the extent that it is unanticipated.
f) Capital controls and exchange controls lower potential welfare.
g) Monetary (and fiscal) policy cannot affect domestic interest rates
except to the extent that it affects the forward premium.Under fixed
exchange rates, therefore, domestic interest rates are independent of domestic
monetary and fiscal policy (other than differential tax treatment of domestic
and foreign interest income etc.).In the next section, I shall describe
some of the ways in which propositions a) through g) must be modified in
the presence of political risk.— 14—
IV.The Implications of Political Risk for the Modelling of International
Financial Markets
IV.lThe demise of interest parity in the presence of political risk
The proposition that political risk, especially default risk, causes
departures from international interest parity -—equalityof interest rates
on domestic and foreign assets after allowing for the cost of forward cover ——
iswell—established (Kenen [1965] ,Kouri[1976] ,Eaton[1978]). The
following example is taken from Eaton [1978].
Consider an investor from country 1 who maximizes the expected utility
of terminal wealth W1 by optimally allocating his initial wealth
between domestic assets paying a safe nominal return r and foreign assets
earning a rate of return in terms of foreign currency (country 2) with
probability Q* and a rate of return -l with probability 1 -Q*.lç*
is the foreign debtor's probability of default. est denotes the logarithm of
the spot exchange rate in period t, e the lcgaritbm of the one period
forward exchange rate in period t. The investor from country 1 allocates
a fraction XF of his initial wealth to the bond of country 1.A fraction
of his initial wealth is used to purchase country 2's currency forward.
The balance sheet of this investor is given below, in Table IV.l together
with the expressions for the returns on his investments.There is assumed
to be no risk of default on forward contracts.At time t the forward
exchange rate e5+1 is a random variable with mean e5+1 and variance
cY.For our purposes it is immaterial whether the investor's utility is
a function of nominal wealth or of real wealth w/p where Pt iS
the appropriate general price level index.For simplicity I shall consider
the case where is the appropriate argument in the utility function.
The investor maximizes E(tJ(wt1)). u' > 0, u 0, where is given
by
(IV.l)
I ss f * s -W=
Wtt(l_XF)rt
+ X (et+l













Forward purchase of Forward sale of
foreign currency Wdestjccurrency \yj
Net worth
Rate of return on the foreign bond: with probability Q &
withprobability 1_Q*
Rate of return on the domestic bond with probability 1
4: Rate of return on the forward contract .- withprobability 1— 16—
Bytaking a second—order Taylor Series approximation at we can express
expected utility as:
(IV.2)
EIU(Wt+i)} u(w) + U' t)E(w+i) + ku" (Wt)E(wt+i_w)2








(IV.5a) =(r*+et_ est) 0* -(l_Q*).
(Iv.5b) R =—
Similarly,in country 2 investors maximize E(U*(W*t+1)) where
is given by:
(Iv.6)Wt÷1 —W=W*tI(l_AF*)r*t + A*S(eft —est+l)+ A*F(rt + est —esti))
with probability Q
Jt*f(l_AF*)r*t + A*(e —estl)
—
A*FJ
with probability 1 -Q.
1 -Qis the probability of country 1 defaulting on debts to country 2,
A*F is the share of country 2's wealth invested in country l's bonds,
and A*5 is the share of country 2's wealth allocated to the forward sale













(IV.9b) R* =Ut"(*)W*/U*l (w*)
LetBt the stock of country 1 bonds and B*t the stock of country
2 bonds. Market equilibrium in the two bond markets and in the forward
market is given in (v.10-12).It is assumed that the initial distribution
of wealth is as follows: residents of country 1 own a fraction ct1 of the
stock of domestic bonds and a fraction of the stock of foreign bonds.








The following conclusions can be drawn immediately:
*
a)If there is no risk of default (Q= Q = 1),market equilibrium requires
*f




b)If there is default risk (0 <Q, Q < 1),but there is risk—neutrality
*












Theexpected rate of retirnfrom investing at home or abroad must be the same
to the residents of any given country if they are to hold both domestic and
foreignbonds; the common expected rate of return could, however, differ as
between residents from different countries:there is "asymmetric" default
risk for a given borrower vis avisdomestic andforeignlenders.What
happens in fact is that at least one country's bond is held exclusively by
that country's own residents: national capital markets become segmented.— 18—
*
c) If there is default risk (0 <Q, Q < 1)interest parity will not prevail,
regardless of the presence or absence of risk aversion.
Note that in the presence of default risk, forward cover cannot fully
eliminate exchange risk.Even if the forward contract is free of default
risk, as we have assumed, not all exchange risk can be eliminated if, as we
have assumed, the default risk is attached to an asset, that is denominated




default risk alone is sufficient to prevent interest
parity from being established.The forward rate will be an unbiased
—s f
predictor of the future spot exchange rate (e+1 =e)
if either there is
no exchange risk or there is risk—neutrality.
IV.2. Risk, asynunetric information and the 'Lemons Principle' in
International Financial Markets
The 'Lemons Principle', due to Akerlof [1970) states that in markets
with asymmetric information between buyers and sellers (e.g. the buyer does
not know the true quality of the goods he buys while the seller does), there
exists an incentive for sellers to offer poor quality goods because both
high and low quality goods sell at the same price.The result is a
reduction in the average quality of the goods traded and a contraction in the
size of the market.This analysis has been applied to credit markets by
Jaf fee and Russell [1976) who developed it into a theory of credit rationing
and by Webb [1979] who uses it to refute Barro's public sector debt neutrality
theorem (Barro [1974)).This section applies Jaffee and Russell's (J.R.)
and Webb's analyses to international financial markets.For simplicity,
exchange risk is abstracted from i.e. the analysis is set in a fixed exchange
rate world which is confidently expected to stay that way.
Consider a two-period world in which a large group of borrowing countries
faces an international financial market in which lenders have access to funds
at a constant rate of interest i.All borrowing countries have identical,
non-stochastic income streams (y1, y) and identical preferences defined on— 19—
consumptionin the two periods (c1,
c2). Some countries, however, are
"honest" and others "dishonest".Honest countries will not default in
period 2 on their loans contracted in period 1.Dishonest countries will
default on their loans if default results in a higher value of secondperiod
consumptionthanrepayment of the loan.In the absence of a penalty for
default,z, dishonest countries will always choose to default.bte that
default in this set-up is always discretionary, as income isnon—stochastic.
Themodel can be extended to allow for stochastic income streams.This results
in 'unlucky' honest countries going into default as wellas dishonest countries,
whether 'lucky' or 'unlucky'.We are not concerned here with the fundamental
determinants of discretionary (or dishonest) as opposed tounlucky default.
These determinants may be entirely psychological, reflecting differences in
national "tastes" for honesty, or they may reflect inter-country differences
in the perceived cost of default, i.e. in the value ofz.Eaton and Gersovitz
[1979, 1980] provide an interesting positive theoretical model of default
behaviour and test it on a sample of LDC's.
There is assumed to be asymmetric information insofar as lenderscannot
differentiate, in period 1, between honest and dishonest borrowers if both
demand the same amount of loans, L, at any given borrowingrate, r.--—If--tenders
could identifydishonest borrowers, they would be excluded from the market.-"
Without such an exclusion rule, dishonest borrowers would always contract forthe
largest possible loan.With this exclusion rule, dishonest borrowers will
duplicate or mimic the borrowing behavior-of the honest borrowers.It is
assumed that the solution to the two—period Fisherian intertexnporal choice
problemwithout default, involves a positive amount of borrowing which is the
same for all borrowers (utility functions are strongly separable in
consumption during the two periods and the 'propensity to default').
With first—period consumption chosen by all borrowers "as if"they were
honest, and with utility an increasing function of consumption in both periods,
the dishonest will default on loans if the value of second periodconsumption- 20-
underdefault exceeds what it would be without default.With default second
period consumption is y2 -z.Without default, second period consumption
is y2 —(l+r)L, where L is the size of the loan.
To characterize the market equilibrium that is generated by this
asymmetric information structure we first derive the demand for and supply of
loans.
The utility maximization programs of the honest borrower is given by




















Given (IV.19), L =L=L,say, and the demand for loans by both types of
borrowers is fully determined by the behavior of the honest ones, represented in
(IV.13—15).This yields a demand functionfor loans,
(IV.20)Ld = y2, r).
We only consider solutions involving borrowing, i.e. Ld >0
We assume that <0: an increase in the borrowing rate reduces the demand
for loans.The substitution effect of a higher interest rate favours
<0,and the negative wealth effect of a higher interest rate on borrowers
will also tend to reduce c1 and thus I. ,ifc1 is a normal good.— 21—
TheSupply of loans is derived from the risk-neutral
expected profit
maximizing behavior of lenders.Following Jaffee and Russell we assume that
the cost of default variesamong dishonest individuals.There are very high
values of z, specifically z >, forwhich no-one defaults. (Note that l+r
y2(l+r) is the largest loanever demanded by honest borrowers).We also
z.
nii n assume there to be a minimum value ofz, z .Forloans less than nan l+r
no-one defaults. Assijjne there is a continuousdistribution function of
dishonest borrowers by z for values ofz above z .Thedistribution of mm
defaults then is a continuous function of(1+r)L for values of L >
l+r
Let A =A((l+r)L)bethe probability that a loan is notdefaulted on.
A((l+r)L) =1for (1+r) L <z .A((l+r)L)is a continuous function of m.n
(l+r)L with A' <0 for (l+r) L >z Expected profits, ir ,ofthe lending mm
institutions are given by
7/ (Iv.21) =(l-i-r)LA((l+r)L) —(l+i)L.
Assuming a competitive loan market withcostless and instantaneous freeentry,
Tr =0,and the supply function for loansis given by:
(IV.22) (l+r) A((1+r)L) =1÷ i
z z. iran nan ForL< ,A=landr=i.ForL>1 wehave A< 1 and r>i. —l+r z. z. iran nan Beyond knowing that for L < , r=iand for L >l+r
,r>i,the slope —1+r
of the supply schedule of loans, LS, is amiDiguous.LS =2.5(r,i) with =r
—(A+(l+r)A'L)
This supply schedule will be upward-sloping if the
(l+r)2A'
elasticity of the A function with respect to A exceeds unity i.e. if
A'(l+r)L>1. Forreasons of space this is the only case considered in
what follows.The demand and supply schedules for loans are drawn in
Figure Iv.l.If, as drawn in Figure IV.l, the demand and supply schedules
z.mmn intersect at a value of L > , thenA <1and r >i the equilibrium l+r
borrowingrate exceeds the lenders' marginal cost of funds: honest borrowers







Theapplication of the Jaffer-Russell model to international lending in
thepresenceof discretionary default risk suggests the following proposition:
Proposition iv.l. If the international financial market clears (we are
at Q in Figure IV.l), the presence of sovereign risk (discretionary default
risk) can lead to the violation of interest parity: the borrowing rate, r,
will be above the marginal cost of funds to the lender, i.
Asecond important potential departure from the efficient markets
paradigm is that a strong case canbe made for the existence of non—market
clearing, rationing equilibria.The assumption of a competitive lending
market with free entry is maintained.Suppliers are therefore always on a
zero expected profit schedule.The assumption of mimicking behaviorby
dishonest borrowers is also maintained, and the A function underlying the
supply schedule is therefore unchanged.Consider again the "normal" case of
an upward—sloping jS schedule.Market clearing occurs at 2 ,theintersection
of d and 9. Normal competitive pressures may appear to rule out any
other position on the schedule as an equilibrium. At an interest rate
below r1inFigure 3 there is excess demand for loans, putting upward pressure on
r;at an interest rate above r1 there is excess supply and downward pressure on
r.However, honest borrowers would prefer arationingcontract such as
Indifference curves in r -Lspace have the shape of 10 and I in Figure IV.l.
They are horizontal where they intersect the demand schedule, with a negative
slope to the right and a positive slope to the left of the intersection.They
are strictly concave in the neighborhood of the intersection.Higher utility
levels correspond to lower indifference curves.Given mimicking behavior by
dishonest borrowers, I is the highest utility level that can be achieved by
honest (and dishonest) borrowers.While they would prefer to borrow at the
interest rate r2, honest borrowers prefer the rationed loan L2 at interest
rate r2 to the unrationed loan at r1.2" Dishonest borrowers always prefer
the larger loan but their preferences are not effective because they do not
wish to reveal themselves.Consider the simple, and not implausible price-— 24—
settingparadigm in which lenders set borrowing rates.If they offer the
loan L2 at the interest rate r2 there will be excess demand for loans, but
honest borrowers will never offer a higher interest rate than r2 for a larger
loanthat can besupplied profitably by the lenders.Lenders could make
positiveprofits for contracts above 2(ignoringfree entry for the sake of
argument), but every such contract is dominated by (r2, L2) from the point of
viewof the honest borrowers.Contracts below l arepreferred byhonest
borrowers but cannot be supplied profitably.If lenders were to offer L2
at r2, there are therefore no clear market forces at work which would cause
lenders to change their behavior.At ',thereis no effective excess demand.
It can therefore be viewed as a (Wilson) equilibrium)" The implications for
the modelling of international financial markets are summarized in Proposition
IV.2.
Proposition IV.2.In the presence of sovereign risk (discretionary default
risk) international financial markets can be characterized by credit rationing.
Even if a market—clearing interest rate—loan configuration exists, it is quite
plausible that a non-market clearing, rationing equilibrium prevails.
IV.3.Other departures from market-efficiency associated with
international asset risks
In the simple model of Section IV.l the existence of default risk meant
the demise of international interest parity.By itself, however, international
interest parity is neither necessary nor sufficient for market efficiency.
The Jaf fee—Russell model of Section IV.2 generated both an inefficient market—
clearing equilibrium and a rationing equilibrium.Such a state of affairs
is indeed inconsistent with the conventional notions of market efficiency
outlined in Section III.The source of this inefficiency is Lnformation
that is not merely incomplete, but unequally available to different market
participants.Such a situation creates an incentive for obtaining additional
information; country risk studies are an example of such effects.The
often quite considerable costs in time, manhours and other resources involved— 25—
inobtaining better information about potential borrowerst creditworthiness
constitutes another departure from market efficiency.Such portfolio
adjustment costs will impede the instantaneous ('stock-shift') rebalancing of
portfolios in response to new information that characterizes the efficient
markets models.Instead portfolios will be adjusted in a slower, gradual
process.High information costs may also be reflected in "thin" markets, with
a low volume of transactions.Indeed, certain markets (the U.S. Iranian
loan market) may dry up altogether.Assets therefore become less "liquid".
The assumption that each transactor acts as if he could dispose of his entire
stock of foreign assets without affecting the price becomes untenable.This
will make the markets less competitive.
Merely to point out that any or all of these effects may result from the
existence of international asset risks is not to make a judgement as to their
actual importance at a specific moment.If international asset risks are in
fact negligible, the efficient markets model will be a reasonable description
of reality.I believe that, merely on the baLs of a quick review of recent
historical events, it is safe to argue that actual international financial
markets are affected frequently and significantly by actual or perceived
international asset risks.
The existence of inefficient (especially quantity-constrained) equilibria
means there is scope for policy intervention (foreign exchange market intervention,
capital controls etc.) that is potentially welfare increasing.No serious study
of the theory of second best as applied to inefficient international financial
markets has to my knowledge been undertaken.The next section of the paper
analyses some of the positive policy issues associated with the presence of
international asset risks.The familiar ad hoc macromodel that is used is
adequate for a narrow positive analysis of policy effectiveness, but does not
permit a consideration of the normative issues.— 26—
V.The implications of political risk for the international adjustment process
withspecial emphasis on the scope for monetary policy: the rehabilitation
of "imperfect capital mobility" and the non-horizontal BP Curve.
The first implication of international asset risk is that domestic and
foreign assets no longer are perfect substitutes to the domestic investor, even
if they are identical in all other respects, including currency denomination.
Specifically, there no longer exists any foreign asset that is riskiess to the
domestic investor, even in terms of the currency in which it is denominated.
The second implication of international asset risk is that rationing may occur;
the supply of loans to an individual borrower (or country) is no longer
perfectly elastic at parametric prices or rates of return.The third major
implication is that transactions costs in international financial markets,
especially the informational costs of evaluating the credit-worthiness of
individual lenders and borrowers is raised significantly.This has
significant implications for the investor's incentive (or indeed ability) to
execute the instantaneous stock—shift changes in portfolio composition that
are such an integral part of contemporary financial theory.I shall analyse
the implications of international asset risk from the point of view of the
authorities' ability to affect domestic interest rates.For reasons of
space only monetary policy is considered.The effect of variations in the
domestic money supply, brought about through open market purchases or sales
of domestic government bonds on the domestic interest rate is analysed in
three models.The first incorporates the assumption of perfect international
credit markets and perfect substitutability of domestic and foreign assets.
The second relaxes the assumption of perfect substitutability and replaces it
by the assumption that domestic and foreign assets are grosssubstitutes.
Foreigndemand for domestic bonds also is no longer perfectly elastic at some
exogenously determined rate of interest.Both models 1 and 2 maintain the
assumptionof negligible transactions costs: stock-shift changes in portfolio
compositionbetween domestic and foreign assets are both feasible and optimal.
The third model assumes significant transactions costs for foreigners— 27—
purchasingdomestic bonds and domestic residents purchasing foreign bonds.These
transactions costs are assumed to be such that stock—shift changes between domestic
and foreign assets are never optimal.This requires that there be costs associated
with the instantaneous rates of change of asset holdings.Lumpy transactions costs





X trade balance surplus
demand for real money balances
*
h:foreign demand for domestic bonds
j:domestic demand for foreign londs
W:privatewealth
G government spending
T:taxes net of transfers
M:nominal stock of money balances
B nominal stock of domestic government bonds
Bd:domestic holdings of donstic government bonds
foreign holdings of domestic government bonds
*
B :domesticholdings of foreign bonds (denominated in foreign currency)
*
R :official foreign exchange reserves (denominated in foreign currency)
r :interest rate on domestic bonds
*r : interest rate on foreign bonds
p :price of domestic output
price of imports(in terms of foreign currency)
e :spotexchange rate (price of foreign exchange in terms ofdomestic
currency)
p :domestic and foreign cost-of—living index
instantaneous stock—shift (differential) operator
(\ . .— 28—
Model1: A simple model without international asset risks.
The model is represented in equations V.1 -V.12.
(v.1) A=Y-X (LM)
(V.2) L = (Is)
p




v.4) 2.=9.(r,Y, W) ;£<0; 2.2 >0;0 <
£3
<1.







(V.8)p =p(ep ) ;0<c<1.
To stay as close as possible to text-book practice I shall consider the
"Keynesian" version of the model which has Y endogenous and p, the price
of domestic output as exogeriously fixed.The model can of course be
easily adapted to handle the "classical" case with Y fixed and p endogenous)-"
For reasons of space only the fixed exchange rate case is considered.In
model 1 it is assumed, without loss of generality for our purposes, that all
domestic government debt is held by domestic residents.Capital formation
is ignored, but could easily be included.The exogenous variables are p,
** * r,p,Gand T.Predetermined variables are private net worth M +B+eB
*
andpublic sector net worth eR -M-B.
The instantaneous stock-shift constraints on changes in public and private
sector portfolio composition are:
for the private sector
*
(V.9) 6M +S8+eóB 0
and for the public sector
*
(V.10)5M +SB-e'SRE0.—29—
The continuous flow constraints are:
the balance of payments identity
.*.* * * * *
(V.11)eB +eR pY+reB —pAEpX+reB
and the government budget identity:
.*
(V12) M + B -eRpG + rB -pT.
In the Keynesian version under a fixed exchange rate, == 0
p
The LM curve will be upward-sloping and with mild restrictions the IS
*
curvewill be downward-sloping.The horizontal line with intercept r
in Figure V.1 is often referred to as the BP or balance of payments
equilibrium schedule.It is of course no such thing.I shall refer to
it as the EPB or external portfolio balance schedule.It shows the
combinations of r and Y consistent with portfolio equilibrium as between
the stocks of internal and external debt.The flow balance of payments
.*
equilibriumcondition (V.11 with R E 0) has no convenient graphical
representation in r—Y space.-' The story of the ineffectiveness of
monetary policy as regards the interest rate is familiar and follows immediately
from equation V.7 with e =0.An open market purchase of domestic bonds by an
amount will not result in an increase in M.Private agents will use the
additional money to purchase foreign bonds to the tune of in the process they
return the increase in M to the authorities in exchange for foreign exchange
required to purchase the foreign bonds.The instantaneous result of this
stock-shift portfolio rebalancing is an unchanged M, a reduction in B by an
* *
amount,areduction in eR byand an increase in eB by .Theinterest
rate and the level of output are unaffected.Domestic (and foreign) portfolio
holders are indifferent between holding domestic and foreign bonds at the common,
*
exogenousinterest rate r because they are assumed to have identical risk
properties.
Model 2: A simple model with international asset risks but without
transactions costs.
In this model domestic and foreign lxnds no longer are perfect substitutes
in private portfolios.With foreign assets perceived as risky by domestic






interest rate is no longer automatically equal to the foreign interest rate plus
the forward premium on the foreign currency and a fortiori it will no longer be
always equal to the foreign interest rate plus the expected rate of appreciation
of the foreign currency.The model is summarized in equations IV.13 -IV.17.
* * d *
(V.13)A(r-p/p, r +e/e-p/p, p/ep ,Y,(M+B +eB )/p, G, T) =
* * d *-
Y-X(r—Lp/p,r+Le/e-Lp/p, p/ep ,Y,(M+B +eB )/p, G, T).












(V.14)9(r,r+e/e, Y, (M+B +eB )/p) =M/p
<23 ° 1.
* d*-. * -
(V.15)j(r,r +e/e, Y, (M+B +eB )/p) =eB/p
<0; >0; 0; 0 < < 1.
* *
(V.16)h (r—e/e, r )= B/p.
(V.17) B +Bd=B.
Without transactions costs each domestic or foreign investor acts as if, at
parametric interest rates, existing portfolios can be reshuff led costlessly.
The stock—shift constraint of the public sector is given as before by (V.10).
The stock—shift constraint for the domestic private sector allows for the
fact that some domestic bonds are held by the rest of the world, as given
by (V.9').
d *
(V.9')'SM +'SB + edBE 0
Note that (V.10) and (V.9') imply:
*f *
(V.18)'SR ='SB —e6B
The continuous flow constraints are:
the balance of payments identity
.*.*.f **f **f
(V.19)eR +eB -B =pY+reB -rB -pA=pX+reB -rB
and the government budget identity, which is the same as before (V.12).— 32—
Equations(Iv.14) and (IV.15) represent the domestic demand for money and
the domestic demand for foreign bonds.The domestic demand for domestic bonds,
h, is suppressed using the balance sheet constraint+ h + j E W E (M + Bd
* —
+eB )/p.Money, domestic and foreign bonds are 'gross substitutes'.If the
demand for noney balances depends positively on income, i >0,then h + j, E
- < 0.Using (IV.l6) and (IV.17) to substitute for Bd and B, and assuming
a fixed price level and a fixed exchange rate, we can summarize the monetary
equilibrium as in equations (V.20, 21 and 22), choosing units such that
* e=p=p=1.
* * * *
(V.20)A(r, r ,1,Y, M + B —h(r, r ,..)+ B ,C,T) =
* * * *
Y-X(r,r ,1,Y, M + B -h(r, r ,..)+ B ,G,T) IS
* * * *
(V.21)i(r, r ,Y,M + B —h(r, r ,..)+ B ) =M LM
* * * * *
(V.22)j(r, r ,Y,M + B —h(r, r ,..)+ B) =B EPB
*
Thethree endogenous variables are r, Y and B if the authorities choose to
control M.Figure V.2 illustrates the effect of an increase in M brought
about by an open-market purchase of domestic bonds by the government.With
*
Man instrument of government control, B adjusts instantaneously to satisfy
*
(V.22).Diagrammatically B adjusts to make the EPB schedule pass through the
intersection of the IS and LM schedules.There is a different EPB schedule
for every value of B*.If j is positive, the EPB schedules will be upward—
sloping, if it is negative it will be downward—sloping.If it is upward-
*
sloping,a higher value of B shifts the EPB schedule to the right; if it is
*
downward-slopinga higher value of B shifts the EPB schedule to the left.
Whether the EPB schedule is upward-sloping or downward-sloping, the effect of
an increase in M is to lower the domestic interest rate.The open market purchase
of domestic bonds will, if the EPB schedule is upward-sloping (Figures V.2a and
V.2b) lead to a stock-shift outflow of capital.This stock-shift outflow is
f * *

























andan increase in domestic holdings of foreign bonds (B =j(r,r ,Y,W).
Since domestic and foreign bonds are not perfect substitutes, domestic and
foreign portfolio holders can only be induced to hold the smaller volume of
domestic government debt by a decline in its interest rate.In Figures
V.2c and V.2d the income effect on the domestic demand for foreign bonds is
negative and the EPB schedule is downward—sloping.In V.2c, where the EPB
schedule is less steep than the IS schedule the lowering of the domestic
interest rate resulting from an open market purchase of domestic bonds is again
accompanied by a stock-shift increase in domestic holdin;s of foreign bonds.
In Figure V.2d the EPB schedule is steeper than the IS schedule, reflecting
a very strong negative income effect on domestic demand for foreign bonds. In
that case the lower r and higher Y resulting from an open market purchase of
*
domesticbonds are accompanied by a stock-shift reduction in B .Therewill
f - *f
still be a stock-shift reduction in B ,butthe combined effect on B -Bmay
wellbe adecline, i.e. there could be a stock-shift inflow of capital from
abroad.Note that imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign
assets results from differences in risk-characteristics of investments among
countries, whether these risk—characteristics are symmetric or not. Asymmetric
political risk can make de facto imperfect substitutes out of assets whose
"de-politicized" returndistributionshave identical risk properties.
Model3:A simple modelwithinternational asset risks and portfolio
adjustment costs.
As in the previous model, domestic and foreign bonds are no longer viewed
as perfect substitutes, due to international asset risks.In addition it is now
assumed that international asset risks lead to significant portfolio
adjustment costs in international financial markets.These costs are to be
thoughtof primarily as informational.In the presence of adjustment costs or
other transactions costs, which we shall view as increasing functions of the
instantaneous ratesof change ofassetstocks, itwillnever be optimal to
engage in instantaneous stock—shift changes in holdings of assets that are
subject to such costs.In our model this means that instantaneous stock—shift
changes in domestic portfolios between M and B are possible, but not between— .3.5 —
thereforealways have the dimension of continuous instantaneous rates of
change with respect to time.The literature on optimal capital accumulation
in the presence of adjustment costs shows that in general the optimal investment
functions will be complicated functions of the initial state and the current
andexpected future values of all variables that are viewed as parametric by
the optimizing agent.If weassume that domestic andforeign bonds have
identical"de-poljticjzed" risk characteristics, model 3can be viewed as
closest to the asymmetric political riskcase, i.e. risk depending on the country
of nabitat of the lender or borrower.If transactions costs (including information
costs) are not an increasing function of therate of change of asset holdings,
stock—shift changes in portfolio compositionwould occur whenever exogenous
parameter changes or disturbances of a certain minimumsize occur.For simplicity
I shall assume that the "asset accumulation
functions" describing the portfolio
behaviour of domestic and foreign residents
can be represented by simple partial
stock adjustment functions based on theno—adjustment costs asset demand functions















(V.24) Yj(r, r +e/e,Y, (M-i-B +eB )/p)
p
* Nostock—shift changes in B willever be optimal, therefore
(V.25) 5M +6Bd0.
* Therealso will be no stock-shiftchange in R
In the presence of "internal"portfolio adjustment costs there isno
* EPBfunction.The historically given stocks ofB and B are always "willingly
held".There is, however, a well—definedflow balance of payments equilibrium
.* * *f.* scheduleor BP curve in r—Y space.Since eR =pX+reB —rB —eB+B
we can, using (V.23) and (V.24) derivethe locus of r and Y pairs for which
* R=0.For the case in which e andp are constant, and setting e =p=p 1,
this gives:
* f* ** (V.26) X(r,r ,1,Y, M+B—B +R- ('P-1-—36—




In the denominator the "capital inflow" effects of an increase in the interest
rate h1 -'Yj1are positive and will be reinforced by a possible effect of
interest rates on import demand (X1 >0).A higher interest rate will, however,
increase the cost of servicing the outstanding volume of foreign—owned domestic
debt.Only if this effect is not too significant will the denominator of
(v.27) be positive.An increase in domestic income will worsen the trade
balance (X4 <0).If it increases the (long—run) stock demand for foreign
bonds (j3> 0)the flow capital account will also be adversely effected.
If <0,the increase in Y would improve the capital account.In the 'texthook
case' both numerator and denominator are positive and the BP curve is upward—
sloping, as in Figure V.3.The initial equilibrium at 2 is assumed to be a
position of balance of payments equilibrium.An increase in M via an open market
purchase of domestic bonds shifts the LM curve to the right, lowers r and raises Y.
The balance of payments moves into disequilibrium.The interest rate falls
because no instantaneous stock—shift change in portfolio composition is possible.
A lower interest rate is required to make domestic bond holders willing to hold
a smaller stock of domestic bonds.Figur& V.3 aTho incoroorDtes the currcn
account equilibrium schedule, CA, whose equation is given by:
* f* **f
(V.28) X(r,r ,1,Y, M+B-B +3 ,G,T) +rB -rB=0. (CA)
Its slope is given by
-x
dr — 4 —
X1—B
Unless B is very large this will be upward-sloping.Unless is very
large and positive the CA curve will be steeper than the BP curve.In
Figure V.3 the initial momentary equilibrium 1 was also assumed to be a
position of current account equilibrium.The momentary equilibrium after














Inthe limit, as transactions costs go to zero and i'and 'I'tend to
infinity together, model 2 re-emerges and the slope of the BP curve tends to the





When domestic and foreign bonds in addition are perfect substitutes
(h1 =+ = —
EPB
=0which is the case of model
*
ForQto bea
full (stationary) equilibrium it is in addition necessary that h =B,j=B
and that the government does not run a deficit or surplus nor engages in
'continuous flow' open market operations (M =— B).Given a policy function
or financing rule to determine M and B, we can trace the full dynamic adjustment
of the model as described by the behavior over time of the four state variables,
* f
B, B ,Mand B .Thisanalysis is omitted here for reasons of space.Also,
it makes little sense to study long-run asset stock adjustment while maintaining
the short—run assumption of sticky prices.
Conclusion
International asset risk implies that domestic and foreign loans cease to
be perfect substitutes in private portfolios, even if they are denominated in
the same currency and are identical in all other respects.The main implication
for the international adjustment process is that even small, financially open
countries regain control over domestic interest rates.Without international
asset risks domestic interest rates were independent of domestic monetary and
fiscal policy actions (other than asymmetric tax treatment of domestic and
foreign bond income) under a fixed exchange rate regime.With market-determined
exchange rates domestic policy actions could only alter domestic interest rates
by changing the forward discountor premium.In the presence of international
asset risks, domestic policy affects domestic interest rates even under a fixed
exchange rate regime.For this conclusion to emerge it is not necessary that— 39—
therebe transactions costs or other adjustment costs associated with changes
ininternational portfolios.All that is required is that domestic and foreign
bonds be perceived as imperfect substitutes and that world demand for the domestic
bond is less than perfectly elastic.Stock—shift portfolio rebalancing will
takeplace but is not carried to the point that all government-initiated changes
in portfolio composition arearbitraged away. If internationalasset risks
cause international financial markets to become significantly less 'perfect'and
portfolio adjustment costs rule out instantaneous stock-shift changes in portfolio
composition, the much—maligned flow balance of payments and the non—horizontal
BP curve can reclaim a measure of respectability.*Iwould like to thank Robert Stern and Clas Wihlborg for detailed written
comments on an earlier version of the paper.Financial Support from an
N.S.F. Research Grant is gratefully acknowledged.
FOOTNOTES
1/ Citicorp, 1975, Annual Report, New York, p. 18.
Citicorp,1975, Annual Report, New York, p. 18.
3/ Mc.W. Wolfe, [1975], p. 35.
4/ From 1967 to 1975 debt to the private markets of 86 country governments
on which the World Bank reports has quadrupled.Even after allowing for
inflation this represents a sizeable real increase (see Eaton and
Gersovitz, [1979, 1980]).
5/ These conditions are (see Frankel [1979]): 1) All assets are nominal
assets (money and bonds) whose returns are riskless in terms of their
currency of issue, or else -—ifthere are other assets ——theirreal
returns are independent of currency values.2) All nominal assets are
"inside" assets.
6/ Section II reviewed some of the ways in which lenders evaluate the default
risk of prospective borrowers through "risk analysis".As long as
borrowers retain information about their own default risk that is
superior to lender information, the analysis goes through.Of course,
with honest borrowers in a "lucky—unlucky" model, the lender's expertise
may well give him information about the borrower's default prospects
that is superior to the information that is available to the borrower.
Note that this is not the Eaton-Gersovitz model.They assume that all
borrowers are potentially dishonest.All will default if the returns
exceed the costs.
7/ For convenience, the lendinc institutions are assumed iiol-torecover any8/ Jaffee and Russell show that if A has the Pareto distribution and if
the mean of this distribution does not exist, then the supply curve will
be positively sloped for r >i.If ithas the exponential distribution
it will be backward-bending.The supply of loans relation need not be
single—valued: it could be a correspondence rather than a function.
Jaf fee and Russell rule out multiple equilibria through the assumption
that A, the proportion of borrowers who do not default, rises with
ralongthe demand curve anddeclineswith r along the supply schedule.
Theassumption about the demand curve is equivalent to c1 and c2 being
'grosssubstitutes': an increase in r increases c2; this amounts to a
greater thanunitaryelasticity of loan demand with respect to the
interestrate.
9/I asswne that the rationing rule is non—stochastic.Each borrower is
provided with a certain loan of at an interest rate r2.If the
rationing rule were stochastic, risk—averse borrowers would derive a lower
level of utility than I fromarandom loan rationing rule with expected
value L2 at an interest rate of r2.
10/ The same conclusion emerges even more forcefully when the backward—bending
supply schedule case is considered.
If labour supply depends on the real wage in termsof p and labour
demandon the real wage in terms ofp, the output supply schedule is
an increasing function of ,evenin the classical modelas long as
ep
1aboursupply is not completely inelastic with respect to thereal wage.12/ Flow balance of payments equilibrium is given by
*
p M+B+eB **
eBpX(r, —-, Y, ,G,T) +reB .Fromthe LM
ep P
M B function (V.2) we find eB =— (9,r-+-2. Y+(9,. -1) + 2. —)
2.312 3 p
13/This kind of partial adjustment function will only be optimal if costs
of adjustment are quadratic and expectations are static.p
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